

---

# THE JOURNAL OF **MILITARY OPERATIONS**

---

DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF WAR

FEATURING

JĀNIS BĒRZIŅŠ

MATTHEW WILLIAMS

BENOIT OLIE

CODY Z.

JACOB STOIL

COLE PETERSEN

The Journal of Military Operations  
ISSN 2312-5926  
All Rights Reserved ©

The IJ Infinity Group, Ltd.

Company number: 514895630

Ha'Neviim 26  
Number 11  
64071  
Tel Aviv, Israel

Website: <http://www.tjomo.com>  
Email: [info@tjomo.com](mailto:info@tjomo.com)

**Editor** Dr Jim Storr  
editor@tjomo.com

**Deputy Editor** William F. Owen  
william@tjomo.com

**Publisher** A.E. Stahl  
aestahl@tjomo.com

### Editorial Advisory Panel

General Sir Rupert Smith  
Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely  
Major General Julian Thompson  
Brigadier Justin Kelly  
Professor Karen Carr  
Colonel Clint Ancker  
Colonel Mike Crawshaw

Colonel John Wilson  
Lieutenant Colonel Egil Dalveit  
Lieutenant Colonel Jan Frederik Geiner  
Dr Eado Hecht  
Major Gerry Long  
Dermot Rooney

### Subscribe For Free

Military Operations is distributed via <http://www.tjomo.com>

### Additional Information

If you'd like to contact an editor regarding submission of articles or Letters to the Editor, see our **contact page**.

If you're interested in advertising with Military Operations, email us at: **adverts@tjomo.com**

If you are experiencing any technical issues, contact technical support: **tech@tjomo.com**

If you'd like to submit a comment or question or any other query, send an email to customer service: **cs@tjomo.com**

**The Journal of Military Operations is solely distributed through its official website.** It may not be shared through other websites as a whole or in any part unless express consent is given by The Journal of Military Operations. As a free publication, this is key to maintaining the journal. Membership, which is free, is required. Explicit permission by The Journal of Military Operations must be granted to the author for the republication of any article. The decision for republication is solely left to the discretion of The Journal of Military Operations.

Moreover, if quoting from an article in The Journal of Military Operations, please ensure that The Journal of Military Operations is properly sourced.

Any publication included in The Journal of Military Operations and/or opinions expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of The Journal of Military Operations or the The Journal of Military Operations Editorial Advisory Panel. Such publications and all information within the publications (e.g. titles, dates, statistics, conclusions, sources, opinions, etc.) are solely the responsibility of the author of the article, not The Journal of Military Operations or the The Journal of Military Operations Editorial Advisory Panel.Group. Such publications and all information within the publications (e.g. titles, dates, statistics, conclusions, sources, opinions, etc) are solely the responsibility of the author of the article, not The Journal of Military Operations or the IJ Group.

DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF WAR

---

THE JOURNAL OF  
**MILITARY OPERATIONS**

---

Volume 2 / Issue 4 / Fall 2014

# A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

As 2014 begins to draw to a close, it is worth reflecting on three conflicts which have drawn the attention of the world's media during the year. They are: the Israeli Gaza operation, the unrest in Ukraine, and operations to counter the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Some analyses of Israeli operations have appeared on the Internet. So have credible open-source reports which highlighted Hamas' manipulation, deception and where necessary intimidation of foreign media reporters. Some reports revealed that Hamas military installations had been built with the clear intention of breaking the laws of armed conflict through their collocation with or near civilian infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and mosques. Perhaps those aspects of warfare are more noteworthy than the actions of the Israeli Defence Forces

The conflict in Ukraine seems to have resulted in a more-or-less permanent division of the country into pro- and anti-Russian zones. Janis Berzin's article, in this edition of Military Operations, describes some of the methods which Russian forces have used. The article includes material taken from open-source Russian military publications. The methods should not come as a surprise, but in practice have been 'hidden in plain sight'. The overall picture could be quite worrying: is this a new wave of 'post-Soviet' military expertise?

We should, however, pause and reflect. Thirty years ago the West reasonably believed that the Soviet Union could, at short notice, invade western Europe with a land force of up to 200 divisions. In practice, about 50 divisions were stationed in the Far East, and not all were at high readiness. Today, the West is faced with a Russia which can (with some effort) destabilize a near-neighbour which used to be part of the Soviet Union: a near-neighbour with a significant ethnic Russian (and demonstrably pro-Russian) minority; a near-neighbour whose grip on western-style democracy was demonstrably weak; a near-neighbour with relatively weak security forces; a near-neighbour which had Russian forces stationed on its territory; and a near-neighbour which is not part of NATO. The West should ask itself: is this the shape of future warfare? Or is this yet another example of western Kremlin-watchers swallowing Russian propaganda wholesale?

Military Operations is very grateful to Janis Berzins for his clear and lucid article. But we should be quite clear: events in Ukraine demonstrate the **limits** of Russia's capability, not their extent.

In September and early October Australian, British and US politicians made remarks that there would be 'no boots on the ground' in Iraq and Syria to face Islamic State forces. This is to be another bombing war, with Special Forces training, assisting and mentoring indigenous forces and controlling air strikes. (Whimsically, should we presume that Special Forces do not wear boots, or that their boots are deniable?)

One is reminded of British RAF 'air control' measures in Iraq in the 1920s. Local levies (for which, read 'indigenous forces') were trained, equipped and mentored. Insurgents were bombed into acquiescence by modern, high-tech airpower. The main advantage to the British Government of the day was that it was cheaper than using conventional land forces. That neatly side-stepped any question of how effective it was, in the long run. Today the cost may not be financial, but rather diplomatic and reputational. The main advantage to the British (and other) Governments today may be that it is cheaper than conventional using land forces, in diplomatic and reputational terms. That neatly side-steps the question of how effective it is, in the long run.

In this edition of Military Operations, Jacob Stoil offers an interesting view of categorising parties to a conflict. Rather than just 'friend – neutral – enemy' or 'green (friendly) – amber – red (hostile)' he suggests looking at protagonists in terms of their primary and secondary interests. Doing so may help predict a protagonist's response to military or political events. One suggests that wise analysts have looked at protagonists' interests for a long time, but that an explicit methodology for doing so may be lacking.

In a related article, Cody Z looks at the typology of violent non-state actors. He proposes that they should be categorised

primarily by their organisational characteristics, hence 'cellular', 'insurgent' and 'state-like'. The results are appealing, not least because they avoid categorisation by tactics. For example, all three can indulge in terrorism and so defining any one type as a terrorist organisation is not particularly useful.

Another article, by Matt Williams, looks at a different aspect of irregular warfare: the force ratios, or more specifically force densities, required to achieve success in counter-insurgency campaigns. The results are compelling, not least because they go beyond any one single figure or ratio. Instead, they consider a range of issues such as whether the campaign is domestic or expeditionary, the probability of success, and the operational approach in use.

Valuable as it is, the article does beg at least one important issue: correlation and causality. The article presents evidence in support of force densities required for varying degrees of success in differing situations. But what cause leads to which effect? Does a given force densities dictate a given probability of success in a given set of circumstances, regardless of the tactics used, which seems unlikely? Is force density actually a co-variable (that is, the correlation may be valid, but the factor which actually leads to campaign success is correlated both with force density and with success)? Or is this just another valueless search for numerical results in a situation where more qualitative insight may be more useful? The article is a clear case of providing some insight in an area where further work is obviously needed.

An insightful article by a serving French officer, Benoit Olie, looks at a completely different issue: initiative. The article looks at psychological aspects of individual behaviour which can result in the exercise of initiative or its opposite, tactical paralysis. However, and perhaps more importantly, it then considers the link between the force's overall operational posture and the exercise of initiative (or tactical paralysis) at the individual level. The resulting insights are challenging, and deserve considerable thought.

Cole Petersen's article 'Over the Beach' develops up a theme which has run almost as long as Military Operations itself: the utility of amphibious operations. It remarks that 'technology has not rendered the amphibious operation obsolete. The largest inhibiting factor for today's amphibious forces is the resource requirement to counter, degrade or circumvent the technological capabilities of the defender.' The article is contemporary, and insightful, but one could perhaps add that that finding was true at Gallipoli in 1915. Or in the many amphibious operations of the Second World War; or in Korea. Or even that the finding is true of most military operations: not just the amphibious variety.

In the last edition of Military Operations, the Editorial contained some statistics relating to the V1 and V2 bombardment of Britain in 1944 and 1945. The correct numbers should have been: about 9,250 (not 3,250) V1s, and about 1400 (not 1,000) V2s, fired at Britain. We apologise for the error.

Finally, please remember that Military Operations is always looking for articles. If you have an idea for an article which is relevant to land warfare, insightful, and will be clear and easy to read, please get in touch with me at [editor@tjomo.com](mailto:editor@tjomo.com).

**Jim Storr**  
Editor, Military Operations  
November 2014

# CONTENTS

RUSSIA'S NEW GENERATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY JĀNIS BĒRZIŅŠ	4
TAILORED FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES MATTHEW WILLIAMS	8
FROM INDIVIDUAL TO OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE BENOIT OLIE	13
KNOW YOUR ENEMY CODY Z.	17
BEYOND TRAFFIC LIGHTS: TOWARDS A MORE COMPLEX HUMAN TERRAIN JACOB STOIL	19
OVER THE BEACH: THE ENDURING UTILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS COLE PETERSEN	22

# RUSSIA'S NEW GENERATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY



---

Jānis Bērziņš

---

Russia considers Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of itself, something that was lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Henry Kissinger put it, 'to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.'<sup>[i]</sup> Moreover it is considered, with Belarus, to be a guarantee of Russia's territorial integrity. This is a very sensitive issue. Historically, one of Russia's most important defense strategies is 'depth'.<sup>[ii]</sup> This explains why it expanded its borders to the West as far as possible. For Russia, it was already difficult to accept that the Baltic States became NATO members in 2004. Moscow claims the West guaranteed that former Soviet republics and satellites would be left as a neutral buffer zone. True or not, the fact is that nowadays NATO's border is approximately 160 km from St. Petersburg, instead of 1,600 km 30 years ago. In the hypothetical case of Ukraine joining NATO, the city of Belgorod that was deep inside the USSR would be on the border.

For Russia, Ukraine is supposed to be a close ally or, at best, neutral. Thus, it considers the involvement of the United States and the European Union in Ukrainian internal affairs to be a direct confrontation to its regional interests. Moscow is rightly convinced that the United States and the European Union were working to attract Ukraine to their sphere of influence, ignoring Russia's natural right to the region. Russia's goal has always been to make Ukraine a friendly and subordinate partner. After the West's interference, this seems to be further out of reach than ever.

Still, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian government is convinced that the West has financed the Ukrainian opposition and organizations such as NGOs with the objective of destabilizing

the Yanukovitch government, it signed an agreement led by the European Union and mediated by the foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany, to end the protests on 21st February 2014. The deal included restoring the Ukrainian Constitution as it was between 2004 and 2010 until September, when constitutional reform was expected to be completed; early presidential elections no later than December 2014; an investigation of the government's violence, to be conducted jointly by the opposition government and the Council of Europe; a veto on declaring a state of emergency; amnesty for protesters arrested since 17th February; surrendering of public buildings occupied by protesters; the confiscation of illegal weapons; new electoral laws to be passed and the establishment of a new Central Election Commission.<sup>[iii]</sup>

Although for Russia the agreement was not optimal, it considered that it was better to face a temporary loss than to face increasing instability. There would be time to establish more favorable conditions for winning the next presidential elections, substituting Yanukovitch with someone more competent. However, the opposition continued to push for Yanukovitch's resignation. Speaking to the crowd from the stage on Maidan, Volodymyr Parasiuk declared that if Yanukovitch did not resign by 10am on 22nd February an armed coup would occur.<sup>[iv]</sup> Police withdrew, leaving government buildings, including the President's residence, unguarded. A new coalition was created in the Ukrainian parliament, with 28 members of its members leaving the pro-Russian Party of Regions' faction.<sup>[v]</sup>

Snipers started shooting at both protesters and the police, with two versions emerging of what was happening. One, supported by Russia, was that the opposition (backed by Western countries) was behind the shootings. The other was that the snipers were from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU, acting on Soviet-era plans with the objective of escalating the conflict, thus justifying an operation to end the protests.<sup>[vi]</sup> If this was true, the result was the opposite. It gave more power to the opposition, which was able to

**TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:** BĒRZIŅŠ, JĀNIS, "RUSSIA'S NEW GENERATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY", *MILITARY OPERATIONS*, VOLUME 2, ISSUE NO. 4, FALL 2014, PAGES 4-7.





pass a bill in the parliament impeaching President Yanukovitch. He and other government officials left the country, and a new government was formed. This triggered Crimea's annexation by Russia.

First, Russia considered Yanukovitch's impeachment to be illegal. Therefore the new government was not legitimate. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the procedure to impeach the President must observe the following procedure: a.) the President is formally charged with a crime; b.) the Constitutional Court reviews the charge; c.) the Parliament votes. The impeachment takes place only if there is a three-fourths majority. Second, Russia considers the new government to have been formed by extremists, who are jeopardizing the security not only of Russians in the Ukraine, but also of Ukrainians themselves. Therefore, Russia argues that it has a moral mission to protect Russians minorities in case their security and basic rights are violated. Third, Russia is convinced that the West betrayed the agreement signed on 21st February. As the opposition continued to push for Yanukovitch's impeachment, the agreement was voided.

Ukraine always represented a red line for Russia. Thus, it decided to act to preserve its regional interests for several reasons. First, and most importantly, it acted to preserve its military interests. Crimea has been the base of the Russian Black Sea fleet for more than 250 years. An anti-Russian government could cancel the agreement permitting Russia to have military bases there. Second, it considers the fact that Crimea became a part of Ukraine in 1954 a mistake, since it has always been a part of Russia. Third, to give a clear message to the West that the Ukrainian issue is a real red line and it should remain in the Russian sphere of influence. Fourth, to show that Russia is to be respected and considered to be of a similar stature to the United States. It does not want to be integrated into the West, but to be an independent actor. Fifth, to divert public attention from Russia's own internal social and economic problems. (However, this is only effective in the short-run. Although Putin's popularity has been increasing since the occupation of Crimea, it is to be expected that Russia's structural problems, combined with the economic sanctions, will make it decline again soon.) Sixth, to make clear that any attempt to split off from the Russian Federation will not be tolerated.

### Russia's Campaign in Ukraine as New-Generation Warfare

Russia's military strategy can be divided into three interrelated levels. First, doctrinal unilateralism: the idea that the successful use of force results in legitimacy. The weak reaction of the United States and the European Union has indicated that the strategy is correct. Second, by strongly adhering to legalism. Without discussing the legal merit of Russian actions, they were all backed by some form of legal act. Putin asked the Russian parliament for authorization to use military power in the Ukraine if necessary. Naturally, it was granted. Russia uses this fact together with the argument that it never used military power in Crimea as a sign of its peaceful intentions. Third, Russia denies that it occupied Crimea militarily, since the troops there were local self-defense forces. In addition, although the number of troops stationed there increased, the total was still within the limits of the bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

Russia obviously supported the referendum promoted by Crimean pro-Russian political forces, who were trying to legitimize Crimea's incorporation. Russia argues that this is a case of self-determination similar to Kosovo. The West considers the referendum to be illegitimate. It violates the constitution of the Ukraine, and it was organized in such haste that there was no option in the ballot paper

for voting for Crimea to remain part of the Ukraine. Russia considers this to be merely legal cynicism. It argues that the West considers events of the same character to be legitimate or illegitimate, according to whether it's in its own interests or not. Russia has also been arguing that its actions are the result of its commitment to defend the Ukraine's territorial integrity in accordance with the many international agreements signed during the 1990s.

The Crimean campaign has been an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one which shares many similarities with their intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. At the same time it is essentially different, since it reflects the operational realization of new military guidelines to be implemented by 2020. Its success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. In addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personal carrier.[vii]

After blockading Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians started the second operational phase, consisting of psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda to undermine resistance, thus avoiding the use of firepower. The operation was also characterized by the great discipline of the Russian troops, the display of new personnel equipment, body armor, and light wheeled armored vehicles. The result was a clear military victory on the battlefield by the operationalization of a well-orchestrated campaign of strategic communication, using clear political, psychological, and information strategies (Ripley & Jones, 2014), the fully operationalization of what Russian military thinkers call 'New Generation Warfare'.

Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
- Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War).	- Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all).
- Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units.	- Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable inter-specific fighting groups.
- Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control.	- Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
- Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation.	- Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc).
- Combat operations on land, air and sea.	- Use of armed civilians (4 civilians; 1 military).
- Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance.	- Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory.
	- Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.
	- Use of asymmetric and indirect methods.
	- Management of troops in a unified informational sphere.

Figure 1- Source: Герасимов, 2013.

The main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are therefore:[viii]



1. From direct destruction to direct influence;
2. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
3. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
4. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;
5. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;
6. from direct clash to contactless war;
7. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
8. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;
9. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;
10. from war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind. As a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy's armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary. Instead, the objective is to make the opponent's military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. It is also interesting to note the notion of permanent war. It denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy is the Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

The phases of new-generation war can be schematized as: (Tchekinov & Bogdanov, 2013, pp. 15-22)

**First Phase:** non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).

**Second Phase:** special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

**Third Phase:** intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

**Fourth Phase:** destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

**Fifth Phase:** establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

**Sixth Phase:** commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

**Seventh Phase:** combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).

**Eighth Phase:** roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.

In other words, the Russians have placed the idea of influence at the very center of their operational planning and used all possible levers to achieve this: skillful internal communications; deception operations; psychological operations and well-constructed external communications. Crucially, they have demonstrated an innate understanding of the three key target audiences and their probable behavior: the Russian speaking majority in Crimea; the Ukrainian government; and the international community, specifically NATO and the EU. Armed with this information they knew what to do, when and what the outcomes were likely to be. They demonstrated that the ancient Soviet art of reflexive control is alive and well in the Kremlin.[ix]

This is very relevant to understanding its strategic significance, since it is the operationalization of a new form of warfare that cannot be characterized as a military campaign in the classic sense of the term. The invisible military occupation cannot be considered an 'occupation', by definition. Not only were the troops already on Crimean territory stationed at Russian naval bases, but they were also officially part of the local civilian militia. The deception operations occurred inside Russian territory as military exercises, including those in Kaliningrad to increase the insecurity of the Baltic States and Poland. At the same time, the Crimean parliament officially (although not legally by the Ukrainian constitution) asked to join the Russian Federation. Ukrainian media was jammed. As a result, Russian channels of communication propagating the Kremlin's version of facts were able to establish a parallel reality, legitimizing the Russian actions in the realm of ideas.

### Final Remarks

The probability of a frontal direct military attack from Russia on a near neighbour is very small. Instead, a Russian attack would probably



follow the first five phases described above. They do not give ground for invoking NATO's Article 5. As a result, direct occupation following traditional warfare methods is not very probable. Rather, Russia would like to split the country and take part of its territory, in the same way as it is doing in Ukraine. To achieve this objective, it will most probably not go beyond the fifth phase of new-generation warfare. The first phase, the one of non-military asymmetric warfare encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures, as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup for the next phase is already happening in many countries of the post-Soviet space. This includes creating discontent among the local population with national institutions. The questions of Russian as an official language, citizenship, the poor level of social and economic development in border regions, are some examples.

The second phase is the initiation of a special operation to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions. The third phase is intimidation, deception, and bribing of government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon

their duties. The fourth phase is to increase instability among the population by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion in border regions. The next and final phase would evolve to the imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with local armed opposition units.

The biggest challenge for a country's security and defense is its unpreparedness to deal with such a scenario. Usually, it is the result of the simplification of strategy by many outside the defense and security sector, to 3rd generation military deterrence. There should be no doubt that the defense ministry and the armed forces should be ready to act in such a scenario. However, national security requires a multilevel approach. Nations need to develop multilayered, comprehensive, defense plans.

Since Russia's strategy is opportunistic, reflecting the notion that any campaign is to be pursued only in the case of certain victory, it will not initiate the second, third, and fourth phases unless favorable conditions are clear. Ensuring that it does not take place is entirely a country's own responsibility. If it does, remedial action may be too late. As the popular saying goes, 'it's no use crying over spilt milk.'

*Jānis Bērziņš is an officer in the Latvian Army*

## REFERENCES

- Bērziņš, J. (2014). Ideological Convergence and Macroeconomic Policy in Latvia. Unpublished, submitted for publication to the European Political Science Review.
- Cohen, A. (2013, September 13) Russia is Back. The National Interest, Available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russia-back-9077>.
- Hirschmann, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kissinger, H. (2014, March 6). How the Ukraine crisis ends. The Washington Post, March 6, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html).
- Ripley, T. & Jones, B. (2014, April 2). Analysis: How Russia Annexed Crimea. IHS Jane's Defense Weekly, vo. 51, issue 14, p. 5.
- Tatham, S. (2013). U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: a Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
- Thomas, T. L. (2004). Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 237-256.
- Герасимов, В. (2013, 27 февраля). Необходимо переосмыслить формы и способы ведения боевых действий. Военно-промышленный курьер, no. 8 (476), available at <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>.
- Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов С. А. (2013) О характере и содержании войны нового поколения. Военная мысль, no. 10, Библиогр. в сносках, ISSN 0236-2058, pp. 13-24.
- [i] Kissinger, H. (2014). How the Ukraine crisis ends. The Washington Post, March 6. Available on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html).
- [ii] The idea of 'depth' as military strategy means the distance between opponent forces and the main structural assets of a country (military frontlines, bases, or industrial and commercial hubs). In operational terms, the greater the distance to be traversed by enemy forces to reach these bases, the better are the chances of a successful defensive operation. Napoleon and Hitler's invasions of Russia/Soviet Union are good examples of the significance of the 'depth' for a country's defense.
- [iii] See the 'Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine', available at [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671348/publicationFile/190025/140221-UKR\\_Erklaerung.pdf](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671348/publicationFile/190025/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf).
- [iv] See 'Люди поставили ультиматум: отставка Януковича до утра', <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/21/7015590/>.
- [v] See '28 MPs quit Party of Regions faction in Rada', available at <http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/191768.html>.
- [vi] See 'Kiev snipers: Who was behind them?', Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0308/Kiev-snipers-Who-was-behind-them>.
- [vii] The BTR-80 is a Russian lightly armored amphibious vehicle with a collective chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) protective system, developed during the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1980s. It has a crew of three men, carrying a squad of seven troops.
- [viii] Adapted from Peter Mattsson's DSPC lecture in Riga 'The Russian Armed Forces Adapted to New Operational Concepts in a Multipolar World?', February 19, 2014.
- [ix] Reflexive control can be defined as '(...) a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action' (Thomas, 2004). For a comprehensive analysis of the Russian and Chinese achievements in this area, see Tatham, 2013.



# TAILORED FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES



© Sadikgulec | Dreamstime.com - Usa Army Soldiers In Iraq Photo

---

**Matthew Williams**

---

## Introduction

Following the rapid victory over Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government in 2003, the conventional fighting quickly ended as an insurgency rose up against coalition forces. Despite better training and equipment, coalition troops proved unable to end the rebellion and the insurgency gradually grew. By the end of 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush announced 'A New Way Forward' which placed General David Petraeus in charge of coalition forces. Bush also authorized a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops while Petraeus implemented a new countrywide counterinsurgency strategy of 'clear, hold, build.' Shortly after these changes were implemented, violence levels dropped significantly, leading one to question whether coalition forces could have ever succeeded, prior to the surge, due to the low density of troops in Iraq.

Quantitative historical analysis suggests certain force requirements are essential to the success of a counterinsurgency. Using the *Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare* and a previous study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), counterinsurgencies will be separated by type (domestic, expeditionary, colonial) and then by the predominant strategy used (enemy-centric, hearts-and-minds, coercion) in order to evaluate the force requirements necessary to succeed given different strategies.[i] Evidence indicates that expeditionary counterinsurgencies require a larger force density than domestic counterinsurgencies. Additionally, population-centric strategies require a larger force density than enemy-centric strategies due to the manpower-intensive requirements of protecting and coercing the local population. And finally, despite conventional wisdom, expeditionary counterinsurgencies which employ a hearts-

and-minds strategy require a smaller force density than those which utilize a strategy of coercion.

## What is the historical force requirement for a counterinsurgency?

In the Winter 1995 edition of *Parameters*, James Quinlivan wrote an article ('Force Requirements in Stability Operations') arguing that force ratios are the best method for determining the appropriate force requirement. Quinlivan determined that a force ratio of 20 troops per 1,000 of the population is required for successful stabilization, which he defined as "[creating] an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions could be carried out." [ii] While Quinlivan's study included peaceful post-war occupations, counterinsurgencies, stabilization, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, he was the first to advocate that force ratios based on a country's population were the best predictor for a successful stability operation. Quinlivan's research led him to believe force ratios had two major implications. "First, few states have populations so small that they could be stabilized with modest-sized forces. Second, a number of states have populations so large that they are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces." [iii] Quinlivan also noted that "rather than being centers of stability on the fringe of disordered interiors, [capital cities and entry ports] are now more likely to be the center of disorder." [iv]

Although his conclusions were made nearly two decades ago, time and experience have confirmed his observations. For example, in the spring of 2007 events began to turn in America's favor in Operation Iraqi Freedom when coalition troops began to reach Quinlivan's ratio. In February 2007 the United States had 152,000 Americans deployed in Iraq, supported by an additional 17,000 coalition troops from other nations. Combined with the Iraqi security forces and the additional American troops that were part of the U.S. 'surge,' the force ratio was roughly 19.1 per 1,000 residents.[v]

**TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:** WILLIAMS, MATTHEW, "TAILORED FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES", *MILITARY OPERATIONS*, VOLUME 2, ISSUE NO. 4, FALL 2014, PAGES 8-11.



While the recommendation found in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Joint Publication 'Counterinsurgency' (FM 3-24 and MCWP 3-33.5) is quite similar to Quinlivan's recommendation, FM 3-24 makes one key change. Instead of basing their recommendation on a force ratio, the writers of FM 3-24 advocate a force density, the number of counterinsurgents per 1,000 of the population in the *Area of Operations*. This is significant because while the goal of most counterinsurgencies is to control the whole country, they typically only have to operate in certain areas where insurgency activity is the highest. In the case of Iraq, there was hardly any violence in the three Northern provinces (the autonomous Kurdish region) and thus they required few or no troops to stabilize.[vi] Because numbers are typically taken out of context, many military analysts argue against their use. It is interesting that the writers of FM 3-24 (and in particular retired U.S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor who recently stated he was the writer who advocated for the ratio) found it important enough to include it.

Not surprisingly, this recommended force density ratio of twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents or a force density of 2.00% (which assumes a population-centric approach) has become the most heavily scrutinized part of FM 3-24. IDA's 2010 study on force densities found that although there is validity in FM 3-24's minimum force density requirement of 2.00%, there are still significant risks at that force density level. IDA went on to show the force density range of 2.00-2.50% was too small and the upper end should be increased to at least 4.00%.[vii] Although other studies have been unable to validate FM 3-24's minimum force density requirement using similar data, IDA offers three explanations. First, IDA 'computed force densities using the populations in the actual area of military operations, whereas most other studies used populations for the entire country.'[viii] Second, IDA 'categorized an operation as a 'success' if the counterinsurgency force was not defeated militarily [whereas] other researchers used broader criteria including political outcomes.'[ix] Finally, IDA 'scored certain conflicts as 'indecisive' (and thus a 'success' militarily) that others scored as a 'loss'.'[x]

## Methodology

While IDA's quantitative analysis was thorough, it over-generalizes and was heavily weighted toward domestic counterinsurgencies which confound its validity when applied to expeditionary counterinsurgencies. This article will build on IDA's analysis by separating the domestic from the expeditionary counterinsurgencies. Due to the relatively small number of expeditionary examples, colonial counterinsurgencies will also be included in the analysis. While colonial counterinsurgencies do not clearly fall into either category, this study will consider them expeditionary counterinsurgencies due to the logistical strain and cultural challenges historically placed on colonial powers. Additionally, conflicts with small footprint third party assistance (El Salvador, Columbia, Philippines) will be considered domestic counterinsurgencies because the majority of the operations were carried out by the indigenous forces.[xi]

The quantitative analysis in this paper utilizes logarithmic regression, an accepted method of extrapolation from small datasets that estimates the probabilities of an event occurring, to reach its conclusions. Specifically, the analysis indicates the required force density of various domestic and expeditionary counterinsurgency strategies to achieve certain probabilities of success based

on the information from IDA's previous study. The scope of the counterinsurgencies analyzed will be limited to the 41 conflict cases IDA initially analyzed. While the IDA analysis was based on the Center for Army Analysis' database of over 100 'irregular warfare' conflicts since World War II, IDA ruled out conflicts that (1) were not large-scale operations and (2) lacked sufficiently complete data on force size.[xii] This analysis will also utilize the IDA's scoring method, which defined 'success' as either a 'win' or 'no lose'. While many analysts argue against the inclusion of 'no lose' cases, IDA believes they can be characterized as 'military successes' in that military operations prevented an insurgent military victory, even though there may have been subsequent political concessions with ambiguous outcomes.[xiii]

This analysis is important because, all else being equal, expeditionary counterinsurgencies will require more troops than domestic counterinsurgencies and demonstrate different force requirements. Foreign troops know less about the population and typically face greater resistance because the local population sees them as occupiers. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, only one percent of Iraqis approved of terrorism, yet over fifty percent approved of attacks on U.S. troops.[xiv] Expeditionary counterinsurgencies typically require extended logistical networks and experience many language and cultural problems.

## Quantitative Analysis

Force Requirements based on Historical Counterinsurgencies (using logarithmic regression)									
Force Density (troops per 1,000 people in the Area of Operations)									
Prob of Success	All COINs	Domestic	Expeditionary	All Enemy Centric COINs	All Popul. Centric COINs	All Coercion COINs	All Hearts and Minds COINs	Exped. Coercion	Exped. Hearts and Minds
50%	15.6	11.9	25.3	19.4	12.6	15.2	9.9	24.3	16.6
60%	22.4	15.4	37.6	24.0	20.1	23.0	17.1	37.2	26.6
70%	32.3	19.8	55.9	29.6	32.2	34.8	29.6	57.1	42.7
75%	38.8	22.6	68.2	32.9	40.7	41.3	40.0	70.8	54.0
80%	46.6	25.7	83.1	36.6	52.0	52.7	51.3	87.7	68.4
90%	67.2	33.2	123.5	45.2	84.3	79.8	88.8	134.6	109.5

As expected, the quantitative analysis strongly suggests expeditionary counterinsurgencies require more troops than domestic counterinsurgencies. The data suggested that, in order to achieve a probability of success of 50%, an expeditionary counterinsurgency requires a force density of 2.53% in the AO; compared to a domestic counterinsurgency which only requires a force density of 1.19%. Considering most commanders would like a probability of success much higher than 50%, it is interesting to note the difference in force requirements between an expeditionary and domestic counterinsurgency continues to grow with the higher probabilities of success. For a probability of success of 75%, an expeditionary counterinsurgency requires a force density of 6.82% while a domestic counterinsurgency only requires a force density of 2.26%. Additionally, the analysis indicates population-centric strategies (either coercion or hearts and minds) require a larger force density than enemy-centric approaches. For a probability of success of 75%, a population-centric strategy requires a force density of 4.14% compared to an enemy-centric strategy which only requires a force density of 3.29%.

The data also supports the hypothesis that a hearts-and-minds strategy requires fewer troops than a campaign that uses a strategy of coercion. While hearts-and-minds strategies do require the



counterinsurgent force to set up checkpoints and regularly patrol the area of operations (AO), coercive strategies alienate the population, sending many of the would be bystanders into the arms of the insurgent force. The differences between the force requirements of a hearts-and-minds strategy and a strategy of coercion are apparent when analyzing the strategies across both counterinsurgency types. When one excludes the domestic counterinsurgencies from the analysis, the difference in the force requirements for the two strategies becomes even greater. For a probability of success of 50%, an expeditionary coercion strategy requires a force density of 2.43% compared to an expeditionary hearts and mind strategy which only requires a force density of 1.66%. If one increases the probability of success to 75%, an expeditionary coercion strategy requires a force density of 7.08% compared to an expeditionary hearts-and-mind strategy which only requires a force density of 5.4%. Another interesting implication revealed during the data analysis is the limited effectiveness and use of enemy-centric strategies in expeditionary counterinsurgencies. Of the 21 expeditionary/colonial counterinsurgencies, the only two campaigns which utilized an enemy-centric strategy (the French in Indochina and Tunisia) failed.

### Implications

Having shown expeditionary counterinsurgencies have larger force requirements than domestic counterinsurgencies, to ensure success, and to avoid failure, military leaders should seriously consider the following implications and recommendations.

First and foremost, expeditionary counterinsurgencies are more complicated and difficult to conduct when compared to domestic counterinsurgencies. In a domestic counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgent force is less limited by logistics. If an expeditionary force outruns its supply chain, it cannot achieve victory. Expeditionary forces must also deal with complex cultural dynamics, unfamiliar areas of operation, and at times different languages and dialects. In a domestic counterinsurgency, the force leadership typically understands the reason for the insurgency, can quickly identify the problem, and the best course of action. Conversely, in an expeditionary counterinsurgency, the force must fight in an unfamiliar country where, regardless of their justification for assisting the host nation in fighting the insurgents, they are almost always considered outsiders. Being an outsider makes it difficult for an expeditionary force to gain the local population's trust, and often limits the amount of intelligence locals are willing to provide. Often further complicating the matter is the language barrier. Expeditionary forces typically have to rely on a translator to communicate with the local population. While many of these translators are reliable, some have attempted to manipulate the counterinsurgent force into thinking a peaceful village is harboring insurgents because the village is of a different background, sect, or tribe. Additionally, translators can have problems in fully understanding military leaders' thoughts or lack the clearance level to attend every meeting. They can be intimidated or bought by insurgent forces or there can simply be too few translators for the number of troops in the AO. Together all of these factors require a country that is conducting an expeditionary counterinsurgency to commit more troops than a country carrying out a domestic counterinsurgency.

Secondly, there are some countries where it will be unfeasible to conduct a successful large-scale expeditionary counterinsurgency

solely due to the large size of the country. Military leaders should recognize these limits and ensure they do not set their soldiers up for failure by sending them to fight in an area too heavily populated relative to the number of troops available.

The next implication is the need for military leaders to determine the level of risk they are willing to accept. This study's quantitative work demonstrated an expeditionary hearts and minds strategy with a troop density of 1.66% in the AO historically yields a probability of success of 50%. While some leaders may find this level of risk acceptable, success is more likely to be achieved by increasing the force density. If a country wants to effectively suppress an insurgency, history demonstrates a force density of 5.4% yields a probability of success of 75%. At the same time though, military leaders should recognize too many troops could lead to diminishing returns as the civilian population may feel occupied and oppressed. While more troops might be able to end all of the violence, this might not be the best approach. As Quinlivan demonstrated in his study on crime and police, some violence is better than taking away the population's freedom. The United States has a force density of 3.1 law enforcement officials per 1,000 citizens.[xv] If U.S. cities were to increase their force density, the number of violent crimes would likely go down but many Americans might begin to feel the U.S. is turning into a police state.

Another key factor for success is the level of cooperation an expeditionary force receives from the host government. Clearly, the more local support the better. As already demonstrated, local troops can help bridge the language barrier and trust gap between expeditionary forces and the native population. Larger numbers of native troops lead the population to feel the government can, and will, protect them after the expeditionary troops leave. This idea was effectively demonstrated in Iraq when coalition forces incorporated the Sons of Iraq into their counterinsurgent forces. Additionally, a larger number of native troops can reduce the force density required as the fighting becomes more like a domestic counterinsurgency.

Despite the historical basis for certain force requirements, military leaders should understand there is no generic optimal force density. The strategy, tactics and non-military (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.) factors are just as important as force density in determining the chances of success in a counterinsurgency. [xvi] While the surge in Iraq definitely helped reduce the violence, other key factors also contributed to the stability. Without the Sunni awakening and al-Sadr's ceasefire, the surge likely would not have been successful.[xvii] Every insurgency is different and each requires the decision makers to correctly frame the problem, state their assumptions, and ensure the ends, ways, and means are all aligned in order to achieve success. Once they have accomplished these steps their work may proceed. Military leaders should continuously evaluate the effectiveness of their strategy and be willing to make the modifications necessary for victory.

As outlined in their 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the U.S. armed forces plan to move towards 'innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.'[xviii] This decision will probably result in fewer U.S.-led coalitions that attempt to conduct large-scale expeditionary counterinsurgencies. Because of this, it can be expected that the force requirements for future counterinsurgencies will more likely resemble those of a domestic





counterinsurgency due to the small number of troops which the U.S. plans to employ. The few troops on the ground will be force multipliers (advisors and high-tech enablers) that will significantly increase the effectiveness of the home country's military. It is important to note this strategy is only viable if the home country has a capable indigenous force. Additionally, a large insurgent force could also prevent the use of this low-profile strategy as this might allow the insurgents to intimidate the indigenous forces into submission. While there has been some success with this indirect approach (Oman, El Salvador, and select cities in Iraq after insurgent activity was destroyed), it has only worked in areas without large-scale insurgent activity.[xix] Another downside to the small-footprint strategy is that the assisting country will probably not have as much control over the host government thus forcing the assisting country to trust and empower partner nations. While the partner nation and the assisting country

might have the same interests at the time of the insurgency, there is no telling what the partner nation will do once the insurgency is successfully defeated.

Clearly, understanding and appropriately applying force requirements in a variety of different counterinsurgencies is crucial. Expeditionary counterinsurgencies require a larger force density than domestic counterinsurgencies. Additionally, population-centric strategies are more manpower intensive than their enemy-centric counterparts. Finally, despite conventional wisdom, hearts-and-minds strategies require fewer troops than strategies of coercion. It is essential that military leaders understand and utilize these three principles in the future when determining the proper role of troops in future counterinsurgencies.

The data and graphs supporting this article can be found [here](#).

*Lieutenant Matt Williams is an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps*

## REFERENCES

- [i] Ian Beckett, *Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, Facts on File, September 2001.
- [ii] James Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Stability Operations,' *Parameters*, Winter 1995, 60.
- [iii] *Ibid*, 60.
- [iv] *Ibid*, 60.
- [v] Peter Krause, 'Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don't Know,' MIT Center for International Studies Audit of Conventional Wisdom, February 2007, 2.
- [vi] R. Royce Kneese Jr., et al, *Force Sizing for Stability Operations*, 44.
- [vii] *Ibid*, iii.
- [viii] *Ibid*, iv.
- [ix] *Ibid*, iv.
- [x] *Ibid*, iv.
- [xi] IDA's data is included in Appendix A. The conflicts IDA analyzed have been broken down to differentiate domestic counterinsurgencies from expeditionary and colonial counterinsurgencies and has also been updated to include the predominate strategy used in each campaign. As the two charts in Appendix B indicate, domestic and expeditionary counterinsurgencies clearly have different force requirements. One can also see expeditionary counterinsurgencies have historically required a larger force and been less successful.
- [xii] R. Royce Kneese Jr., et al, *Force Sizing for Stability Operations*, Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2010, 2.
- [xiii] *Ibid*, 28.
- [xiv] David Gompert and John Gordon IV. *War By Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008, xxvi.
- [xv] James Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Stability Operations,' 61.
- [xvi] R. Royce Kneese Jr., et al, *Force Sizing for Stability Operations*, 5.
- [xvii] Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro, 'Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?' 16-17.
- [xviii] US Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Defense Strategic Guidance, January 2012, 3.
- [xix] Carter Malkasian, 'Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar,' *Defense Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2008, 98.

*Interested in strategy? Don't miss Military Operations' sister publication, Infinity Journal.*

# Infinity Journal

**Because Strategy Never Stops**



<https://www.infinityjournal.com>



# FROM INDIVIDUAL TO OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE



---

**Benoit Olie**

---

In May 2013 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) released the fifth edition of its *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-V). This book is the worldwide reference for diagnosis, amongst others, of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Major modifications have been made, compared to the previous edition. Exposure to traumatic events have been taken into consideration has been expanded to 'non-combat' situations, such as those encountered by first responders, and sexual violation. Another major change, as mentioned on the APA website, is that: 'Language stipulating an individual's response to the event – intense fear, helplessness or horror, according to DSM-IV – has been deleted because that criterion proved to have no utility in predicting the onset of PTSD.'

Since PTSD is the main diagnosis of psychiatric issues amongst soldiers and veterans, it appears important to position and define helplessness in military PTSD. Military PTSD sufferers are, arguably, a population of subjects for whom action and a 'grip on events' have a strong significance. Although DSM-IV mentioned intense fear and horror alongside helplessness, we will exclude them from our study: if helplessness is due to intense fear or horror, i.e. when the soldier is 'stunned' by the shock of horror or by an incapacitating fear (what Dave Grossman names 'condition black' in *On Combat*), we will consider this as fear and horror. What we would like to study as 'helplessness' is a physical and/or cognitive incapacity to get a grip on events. That helplessness can be due to rules of engagements, direct orders, or physical limitations (eg, enemies are out of range or impossible to identify). We will then consider that a soldier is not subjected to that helplessness if he is able to take decisions and to act, and interact with the given event.

The hypothesis suggested by this paper is that 'military helplessness'

is to be avoided because it is a major stressor on soldiers (men and women of action) and may cause stress disorders and even psychiatric casualties. Therefore, tactical immobility, which may be the main reason for military helplessness, is to be avoided as well. As tactical immobility is generally due to a lack of operational initiative, seizing operational initiative may be the answer to stress disorders generated by 'military helplessness'. Although not necessarily done in current and recent operations, this is nothing new. However, the implication and the logical flow from individual to operational levels may be used the other way around when facing an operational dead-end.

## **'Military helplessness', taken as the inability to fight back, can lead to stress disorders**

---

In July 1980, Joanne Weinberg, Mary Erksine and Seymour Levine published the results of an experiment conducted on rats regarding shock-induced stress[i]. They administered electric shocks to the rats. Some were alone in their cage; others were in pairs and fought against each other after the electric shocks. The scientists then evaluated the level of stress of the rats through the presence in their bodies of a specific hormone (adrenocorticotrophic hormone, ACTH). They found that those rats which were shocked individually presented far higher levels of ACTH than those shocked in pair and thus able to fight. They also found that the rate of lowering of ACTH in the blood of rats which fought was not related to the amount of fighting but only to its occurrence.

Electric shock generates pain but also fear and (because there is nothing that can be done about it) frustration. Fighting is a way of overcoming the stress thus generated. In a relative sense, that experiment is similar to a situation known by many soldiers that would describe themselves as 'stuck inside the wire'. Being the target of rockets and shells fired randomly at you and not being able to do anything about it or to fight back creates the same feelings (fear and frustration), thereby generating stress. That situation, repeated over and over again, could lead to stress disorders or to a modification

**TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:** OLIE, BENOIT, "'FROM INDIVIDUAL TO OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE'", *MILITARY OPERATIONS*, VOLUME 2, ISSUE No. 4, FALL 2014, PAGES 13-15.



of the soldier's behaviour, as they try to find a way to overcome stress. One example of this is provided in Errol Morris' 2008 documentary about the Abu Ghraib events, *Standard Operating Procedure*. The interview of Military Police Sergeant Javal Davis is very explicit:

'Incoming, incoming! You got to run, boom. God damn, you get mad because it happens over, and over, and over, and over again. After a while, the fear goes away and you just get angry. It's like: 'Damn it! Can't we shoot back?!'

This example shows how the physical inability to act, 'military helplessness', can generate excessive and sustained stress. In the end that may result in stress disorder or altered behaviour.

Sometimes, the inability to act may simply be a legal issue, not a physical one. This is notably the case in peacekeeping operations. Peter Kosminsky's *Warriors*, the drama about British peacekeepers in Bosnia in 1993 during the ethnic cleansing in the Lašva Valley, shows how the rules of engagement and the duty of maintaining impartiality resulted in an almost total inability to act or to get a grip on events. The fiction also shows how the frustration resulted, for many soldiers, in various kinds of PTSD.

A documentary, Peter Raimont's 2004 *Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, tells the story of ten Belgian paratroopers who were massacred in Rwanda, while protecting First Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana on the morning of the 7th of April 1994. In this video, one can see the interviews of other Belgian elite troops just before embarking on the plane that brought them home. They had been ordered to stay in their positions and were therefore unable to help their comrades. They expressed how that 'military helplessness' turned into rage for some of them, and to acute survivor guilt for others.

Another observation of the Weinberg, Erksine and Levine experiment is that, when isolated in an individual cage, rats which previously were in pairs and fought after the electric shocks continue to display a lower rate of ACTH. In other words, rats which could initially fight to overcome trauma and stress were subsequently more resilient to the shocks, even if they could no longer fight. This relates to another experiment, conducted on dogs, about 'learned helplessness'. In 1967, Martin Seligman and Steve Maier inflicted electric shocks on dogs. Some of them could avoid the shocks; others were restrained and could not. After a few shocks, the dogs which were previously unable to avoid the shocks were given the opportunity to do so. They did not. They were completely resigned to their fate (of receiving shocks). Moreover, some dogs displayed signs similar to those of clinical depression. Again in a relative sense, that experiment could suggest that protracted 'military helplessness', besides possible stress disorders and alterations of behaviour, could be a cause for a psychiatric condition.

'Military helplessness', the inability to fight back or to act upon events, is a different condition from intense fear and horror, both of which can generate helplessness as a sort of paralysis. 'Military helplessness' is an individual condition that is not due to individual internalised factors such as fear or horror, but to environmental factors such as rules of engagement or the physical impossibility to act. As such, it is mainly imposed by issues at the tactical (as opposed to the individual) level.

### Individual 'military helplessness' as a result of tactical immobility or paralysis

If we consider that 'military helplessness' generates sustained stress and frustration that can result in stress disorders and even, in extreme cases, in a psychiatric condition, we can spot a very paradoxical situation in low intensity or counter-insurgency conflicts: tactical caution may create psychiatric vulnerability. Ironically, keeping soldiers inside their Forward

Operating Base in order to avoid casualties in combat may appear to be a good way of avoiding public opinion overreaction to the death of servicemen and women. A result of being operationally inefficient, that tactical immobility — actively chosen; as opposed to tactical paralysis, which is imposed — will generate 'military helplessness'. In turn that may generate at least a psychiatric vulnerability, or at worst psychiatric casualties.

Therefore, ending tactical immobility, which implies a tactical risk, can alleviate 'military helplessness'. General Petraeus proved the point with the implementation of counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics in Iraq: taking a physical risk gave back to units their tactical freedom of action and therefore an individual's grip on events. What Thomas Ricks describes in his book as *The Gamble*, is simply the risk of more physical casualties. In the winter of 2006-2007, that risk was not welcomed by American public opinion. The decision was taken in expectation of regaining a grip on events, and stopping both guerrilla attacks on isolated bases and terrorist strikes on the civilian population and military convoys. Back in the cities, among the population they were defending, patrolling on foot in the streets, US soldiers managed to get back a grip on their image and their relationship with Iraqis. They were able to collect intelligence again. In the end, they got the ability to identify and act against decisive targets. At that point they were able to fight back and ended their 'military helplessness'. Physical risk diminished psychiatric vulnerability. Tactical freedom of action translated into an individual grip on events and helped relieve frustration-based stress in soldiers.

In high-intensity conflicts, 'military helplessness' can sometimes simply be a question of firepower. Heavy bombardment, be it from aviation or artillery, can prevent the individual from moving or doing anything other than taking cover. This phenomenon was studied extensively by Reuven Gal and Hava Dayan in relation to heavy bombardments during the Yom-Kippur war in 1973. In a paragraph of their study dedicated to the feeling of helplessness, they wrote 'Helplessness: A very sharp rise was found in the feeling of helplessness among the combatants who stayed in the bunker, as opposed to a slighter rise in that feeling among the combatants who remained outside the bunker during the course of the shelling.' [ii] They evaluated the feeling of helplessness on a scale from 0 to 2, and over a period of shelling of three hours. For the soldiers inside the bunkers, that feeling started at 0 at the outbreak of shelling and peaked at 1.6 two hours later. For those outside the bunkers, it started at 0.6 at the outbreak of the shelling and peaked at 1.4 two hours later.

John Keegan expresses the same concern on 'military helplessness' in full-scale combat operations in *The Face of Battle*:

'It is a function of the impersonality of modern war that the soldier is coerced, certainly at times by people whom he can identify, but more frequently, more continuously and more harshly by vast, unlocalized forces against which he may rail, but at which he cannot strike back and to which he must ultimately submit.'

Since tactical immobility or paralysis generates 'military helplessness', tactical freedom of action alleviates it. Freedom of action can be gained through risk-taking, mainly in low-intensity or COIN operations, or through matching firepower and movement support in high intensity conflicts. In both cases, what happens at the operational level will have a critical influence on tactical freedom of action.

### Tactical paralysis results from the operational loss of initiative

Operational initiative allows those who hold it to decide at least one of the elements of the battle (time, location, target) while the other side cannot. This provides whoever holds the initiative with



a military 'first mover advantage'. Freedom of decision on one or a more aspects of the battle leads to freedom of movement. The opposing party can only react, and therefore has limited freedom of action. This, in turn, leads to partial or complete tactical immobility.

Seizure of lost initiative is a way to regain lost freedom of movement. According to Clausewitz, the seizure of initiative can follow the moment when the enemy reaches his culminating point. That manoeuvre, often requiring the commitment of one's own reserves after the enemy has unsuccessfully committed his, is illustrated by the transition from defence to attack. The battle of Marne, fought by General Joffre from 9 to 12 September 1914 is a good illustration. (One could argue that it resulted in a partial failure to exploit because Joffre's own reserves could not be deployed as quickly as he wished.) The tactical change of posture also results in an individual change of mental posture for soldiers: shifting from defence to attack, they mentally shift from risk of defeat to chance of victory.

Just as tactical risk-taking can grant individuals a grip on events, operational risk-taking can grant tactical freedom of action. One of the most famous examples would be General McArthur and the Inchon landing on September 15, 1950. General McArthur's staff was almost unanimously against the idea of the Inchon landing since it had been evaluated as far too risky, and on difficult beaches for which intelligence was incomplete. General McArthur pushed the idea through, took the risk, and managed to regain freedom of action and psychological advantage. He managed to 'freeze' the enemy by creating surprise. They thought Inchon was too far and too risky for the UN troops to dare to conduct that manoeuvre.

The loss or absence of operational initiative, which in low-intensity conflicts can be seen as operational caution, restrains tactical freedom of action and generates 'military helplessness'. Then, just as at the tactical level, risk-taking can be a way to seize the initiative back. Operational initiative leads to tactical freedom of action and to an individual's grip on events. Arguably, things might work the other way around.

### Individual initiative can bring back operational initiative

Operational surprise is one of the greatest achievements of a general, because it may paralyze the enemy with shock, fear and horror. This is true not only for units but also for the individuals within those units. Seizing the initiative enables the tactical level and empowers the individual level. The operational benefit is transferred to tactical level and in turn to individual level.

But initiative can be 'transmitted' the other way around, by the daring individual actions of a few. (Interestingly, we call them 'individual initiatives') In turn they enable freedom of action at the tactical level and seizing the initiative at the operational. This

is exceptionally well described by Karl-Heinz Frieser in his book *The Blitzkrieg Legend*<sup>[iii]</sup>. The book is an historical analysis and description of the 1940 Western campaign and the battle of Sedan. Frieser explains that the German *Blitzkrieg* was actually a myth created retrospectively by Goebbels in order to take advantage of that success for propaganda purposes. He explains that Guderian actually disobeyed orders to slow down his advance, and exploited westwards after Sedan. This astonishing operational success was made possible by tactical initiatives and disobedience by great leaders, in particular Guderian. In other words, the tactical level, by exploiting its freedom of movement and action created operational initiative and enemy paralysis.

Interestingly, Frieser's work is full of examples of low-level actions that enabled tactical freedom of action. For instance, a combat squad in a truck dismounted to confront a rifle company, thus maintaining the use of that road. There are individual level examples as well. For instance, Feldwebel Rubarth, a combat engineer, single-handedly stormed a combat position on the bank of the river Meuse, enabling whole units to cross.

Arguably, by enabling the individual initiative, *Auftragstaktik* (equivalent to the British 'mission command') may be easier to achieve when the operation is about seizing ground than in counter-insurgency. Feldwebel Rubarth did not need to 'master the spaghetti bowl' to do what he did. But that could be what is at stake in COIN operations: finding a way of fostering valuable individual initiative.

### An alternate, down-up, way of planning?

This article refers to well-known principles. Of course, operational initiative is critical. Of course, tactical freedom of action is central. And, of course, each is related to the other. This article proposed to look one step closer to the battleground, at the individual level. Starting from observations on stress and 'military helplessness', this article examined how operational and tactical levels could interact with the individual one. We saw that the operational lack of initiative results in tactical immobility or paralysis. At the individual level, this generates a feeling of helplessness that may generate altered behaviours, stress disorders and even psychiatric conditions. Operational initiative is the starting point of a vicious or virtuous circle, influencing soldiers' morale and possibly mental health.

What this article also proposed is the hypothesis that this virtuous circle could be studied and implemented backwards: from the individual grip on events, to tactical freedom of movement and operational initiative. This ultimately provides an alternate way of conducting estimate and planning: when the search for a way to regain initiative is fruitless and hopeless, why not let go of the operational level for a moment, and try to think about how foot soldiers can be empowered to exert their own grip on events?

*Benoit Olie is a serving air despatch officer in the French Army. He is a graduate of the British Joint Services Command and Staff College*

## REFERENCES


[i] 'Shock-induced fighting attenuates the effects of prior shock experience in rats.' *Physiology & Behaviour*, Vol. 25(1), July 1980, 9-16.

[ii] Gal, Reuven and Dayan, Hayan. *The Psychological Effects of Intense Artillery Bombardment: The Israeli Experience in the Yom-Kippur War* (1973). The Israeli Institute for Military Studies: 1992, p. 46.

[iii] Karl-Heinz Frieser is a German officer and historian. His book, first published in 1995, was translated into French in 2003 and in English in 2013.



# A NEW BOOK FROM IJ EDITORIAL PANEL MEMBER ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II



## Reconsidering the American Way of War

US Military Practice from  
the Revolution to Afghanistan  
**Antulio J. Echevarria II**

*"Reconsidering the American Way of War is a thoughtful, rich, and convincing examination of how and why the United States has used military force to accomplish national objectives throughout its history. Echevarria dismantles the various proponents of a unique American 'way of war' by proving that US military practice has always been shaped by the politics of the moment. His thesis that there is no unifying theory is refreshing in its clarity and rife with strategic and operational implications. This book demands attention; a must-read for military officers, politicians, academics—and pundits—who all too often ignore the inherently pragmatic nature of the American approach to war in their attempts to shape the policy debate."*

—David E. Johnson, director, chief of staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group and author of *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945* and *Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza*

978-1-62616-139-9, hardcover, \$49.95 **\$34.97** / £38.50 **£26.95**

978-1-62616-067-5, paperback \$29.95 **\$20.97** / £24.00 **£16.80**



FOLLOW US @GUPRESS



AVAILABLE AS EBOOKS FROM  
SELECT EBOOK RETAILERS.



## SPECIAL DISCOUNT OFFER FROM GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS Discount Code TX63

Georgetown University Press is happy to offer IJ subscribers a 30% discount on the purchase of this book.

**United States:** Order online at [www.press.georgetown.edu](http://www.press.georgetown.edu) Phone: 800-537-5487.

US orders please go to the website and order through the online shopping cart or phone the 800 number to reach a customer service specialist who will take your order.

**UK, Europe, Near and Middle East, and North Africa:** Subscribers outside the US in these areas can place orders through NBNi in the UK. Email your order to: [orders@nbninternational.com](mailto:orders@nbninternational.com) Phone: +44 (0) 1752 202301.

# KNOW YOUR ENEMY



---

## Cody Z.

---

In modern warfare, a commander must know much more than the strength and armament of his enemy. Units often must suppress an insurgency, dismantle terrorist cells, or defeat a hybrid group with state-like capabilities, within the same battlespace. The basic skills of fire and maneuver are still the core competencies of the soldiers fighting the battle, but the commanders of these units must also develop an understanding of the enemy to best utilize the skills of the warfighter.

Ideally, every commander would deploy with full knowledge of all enemy groups operating in or near his battlespace, but even under the best conditions this is essentially impossible. In the absence of this information, broad approximations of the enemy must be made to allow for strategic planning. In the past decade-plus of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military units have become highly proficient at killing High-Value Targets, but they are often ineffective in actually destroying the enemy organization.

### Understanding the Enemy:

---

What needs to be developed is knowledge of the different types of enemies on the battlefield. If the commander understands the enemy, they can develop a strategic approach to defeating him. 'Kill or capture' missions are not strategy, nor are vehicle checkpoints. These are tactical operations, and must be part of a larger approach for defeating the enemy. To inform this approach, the commander must understand the enemy's center of gravity and the resources (whether physical, abstract, human or terrain-based) on which he relies. While innumerable variations of each type can emerge, there are three broad categories of enemy type: cellular, insurgent,

and state-like. These categories are established using composition-based definitions, rather than tactical definitions, and while minor adjustments must be made for specific groups, each category dictates a basic strategy for the commander to implement. The terms were chosen carefully, in order to generically describe the enemy type, without categorically excluding any relevant groups. For example, cellular groups are often described as terrorist groups, yet this is a tactically determined moniker. The characteristics and composition of a group are the keys to defeating it, not the methods by which they carry out their attacks. Furthermore, the term 'hybrid' is often thrown around, sometimes simply as a buzzword. In this model, the phrase 'state-like' is used. The purpose of this is twofold: it more accurately describes the relevant organizations, and serves to encompass actual state actors in the enemy type.

The remainder of this article will describe each enemy type and their critical characteristics. The model, henceforth referred as the typology of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), is not intended to be fine-grained and inform the reader as to every detail of the group. It is intentionally broad so as to be useful in the greatest number of situations while remaining parsimonious.

## Typology of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs)





---

### Typological Categories:

---

The most basic type of violent non-state actor is the cellular group. Composed of highly loyal members, who dedicate most or all of their time to the cause, these groups are unique in that they rely on outside entities for all organizational needs. They cannot arm themselves (with the exception of a small number of light weapons) and they cannot effectively recruit without sacrificing organizational security. All functions of command and control are covert, and the identities of cell members are closely guarded secrets. The prototypical cellular group is often a subsidiary of a larger VNSA, as illustrated by the Hamburg Cell of al-Qai'da.

A key aspect of this group is their need for outside support. While cellular groups are often small enough to be eliminated with a 'kill or capture' strategy, it is also possible to combat them by simply cutting lines of communication and supply. Curfews, mobile phone jamming and vehicle checkpoints are all useful tools in a blockade-like strategy that would starve these groups of vital supplies.

Insurgent groups are characterized by one extremely important feature: they rely on popular support and are reliant on the favor of the local population. Much like cellular groups, they operate in a covert manner and maintain underground armories, safe houses and clandestine communications networks. Insurgent groups are generally much larger than cellular groups, and due to their covert, local nature are dispersed widely throughout the community. If an insurgency is to survive, it must constantly recruit new members and preserve the security of the organization. FM 3-24 constantly reminds us that counterinsurgency is a war of information, and the local population holds critical information. If the insurgents fall out of favor with the locals, they will cease to be protected and can be defeated. An insurgency must be actively supported to survive. Without safe houses and loyal friends, they can easily be routed out. To maintain this support, they need to provide the population an acceptable message to support, and basic benefits. These benefits are generally individual in nature and often take the form of bribes, death benefits, or modest stipends. This ties locals to the organization on an individual basis, motivating the level of effort required to support the insurgency. Knowing this weakness will help the commander understand that strategies such as limited raids on safe houses will be of little use, as their supporters will simply supply another location. Rather than relying on violent measures, insurgencies should be countered with population centric approaches, the details of which are outside the scope of this paper.

Finally, there is a much-studied and poorly understood set of groups with capabilities that vastly exceed the previous two. This category, typified by VNSAs such as Hizbullah and ISIS, is often referred to as hybrid, implying that they combine characteristics of states and violent non-state actors. In this typology it is irrelevant whether an

entity is formally recognized as a state; all groups capable of meeting the Weberian requirement to maintain a 'monopoly of violence' within its borders can be considered 'state-like.' These groups are also characterized by their ability to take and hold territory and their need to provide public goods.

While many fear the strength of these groups and their ability to impact the international order, their very nature exposes a number of weaknesses. By taking and holding territory, they assume responsibility for that territory, and neglecting that responsibility can have lethal consequences. Much like an insurgency, they must maintain support within the community, albeit at a much lower level. They are a visible governing force and are subject to dissent, rebellion and overthrow. To placate the population they must provide the basic public good required for survival including water, electricity, sewage and security. The level of commitment required for locals to expel a state-like group is much higher than that required for an insurgency. It was noted above that an insurgency must provide a message that is acceptable to the population. There is a similar requirement for a state-like group to survive, but once again it is to a lesser extent. While a state-like group would benefit from having a population that agreed with its message, it is sufficient for it to refrain from taking actions that are drastic, highly public, or highly offensive to the population. In situations where VNSAs are able to establish a strong presence, basic provision of goods and security is generally sufficient to keep the population from rebelling.

Looking at the characteristics of state-like groups, it is clear that they have many of the same weaknesses as states. To effectively maintain control over their territory, they must maintain basic infrastructure; which can be targeted. Similarly, they must maintain constant lines of communication and supply to remain viable. These logistical trains are clear targeting opportunities. Since access to the territory is denied, the population cannot be influenced using basic COIN principles, but traditional Psyops can be highly effective. Additionally, commanders should consider the fact that many of these groups are not well-suited to governing and are likely to implode with little to no outside influence. Covert action and sabotage may accelerate this process.

---

### Conclusion:

---

As shown in the descriptions of the groups, each category has unique strengths and weaknesses. A strategy that effectively neutralizes one group may be useless or even counter-productive against other. The purpose of this typology is to give commanders, planners and policy-makers rough but accurate groupings with which to understand these groups and begin the planning process. Rather than building plans from scratch, basic frameworks can be established for each category and perhaps for more specific sets within the categories.

---

*Cody Z. is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology currently working as a military analyst*



# BEYOND TRAFFIC LIGHTS: TOWARDS A MORE COMPLEX HUMAN TERRAIN



---

Jacob Stoil

---

Increasingly, contemporary operations take place in a complex environment involving a number of local actors. There have been numerous attempts to make sense of this environment. Influence operations, for example, tend to classify local forces as friendly, neutral, adversary, or enemy. Many field officers prefer a 'traffic light' model, according to which local actors are classified green, amber (or yellow), or red based on their place on a spectrum of friendliness to hostility. Still others use a system of green, blue, red, yellow, and white. These characterisations of actors within the human terrain of a given situation can be highly problematic and hinder operational effectiveness. Although they are an improvement on the simple binary of 'friendly' or 'hostile' that preceded them, they share the same fundamental flaw; a presupposition that actors relate to each other in a binary manner, occupying only one point on the spectrum. While these means of classification allow for complexity of issues and motivations, at a fundamental level, they still assume that there are those who are hostile and those who are friendly. In this way, they neglect the concept of aligned motivation. Aligned motivation occurs when one actor shares a set of goals in common with another. These shared goals can be either global or local. This does not however mean that the actors are friendly. As a result, there have been times in history in which, applying the traffic light model, organisations would have been simultaneously deepest red and darkest green. The case of the relationship between the primary Zionist paramilitary group in Palestine and the British Empire during the Second World War is a perfect example of such an occurrence. Depending on where an officer sat in the British administration, he could code the Haganah green or red, and both would have been correct. From 1939 onwards, the Haganah was both the primary supporter and guarantor of the British Mandate in Palestine and

its primary threat, armed, organised, and fundamentally hostile to British goals and policy.

Starting in 1940, the British security establishment in Palestine came to rely on the Haganah for many of its functions. The Haganah provided garrison forces, special operations support, intelligence, and policing for the Palestine Mandate.[i] More critically when, in 1944, another Zionist paramilitary group, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), began a rebellion against the Palestine Government, they turned to the Haganah, and the Haganah was largely responsible for the successful counter-insurgency that marked that period. The Palestine Government became so reliant on the Haganah for countering the Jewish insurgency that it did not develop significant capabilities of its own. In this narrative of events, the Haganah could not have been a better ally. However, at the same time, the Haganah continued to stockpile weapons, train illegally, agitate against British government policy, organise demonstrations, and threaten future violence if Britain did not meet certain demands. This, along with its ability to mobilise tens of thousands of fighters, made the Haganah a significant threat to the Palestine Government. When, in 1945, the Haganah joined with the IZL to form the United Resistance Movement, all the worst predictions, offered by those who said the Haganah was nothing but an implacable enemy, came true. The binary of 'friend' or 'enemy' clearly did not apply in this case, and may in fact have seriously damaged the British Empire's ability to assess the situation accurately.

Neither the 'traffic light' model nor the scale of 'friendly, neutral, adversary, or enemy' would have been a better fit. The Haganah was at once friend, adversary, and enemy, cooperating with the British Government because of an alignment of motivations. The Haganah shared certain global objectives with the British Government and was motivated to cooperate to further those goals. The types of cooperation in which the Haganah engaged also benefited it as an organisation. Suppressing the IZL gave the Haganah unquestioned primacy among the paramilitaries in the Palestine Mandate and

**TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:** STOIL, JACOB, "'BEYOND TRAFFIC LIGHTS: TOWARDS A MORE COMPLEX HUMAN TERRAIN'", *MILITARY OPERATIONS*, VOLUME 2, ISSUE NO. 4, FALL 2014, PAGES 19-20.



some degree of control over its rivals. The Haganah also had an interest in the further development of the Palestine Mandate and the peace and security of its Jewish population – all of which could be achieved through cooperation with the British. As long as this was the case, the Haganah stayed on side. Yet when the Haganah switched sides in October 1945, all the above benefits remained. What had changed?

A 'red flag' moment had occurred. If local forces cooperate with foreign forces primarily out of aligned motivation, then red flag moments happen when a given event means that cooperation must cease, no matter the benefits of cooperation or the alignment of objectives. For the Haganah, the red flag moment was the newly elected British Labour Party's announcement that it would not fulfil its campaign pledges in altering Palestine policy. The timing and nature of red flag moments such as this have repeatedly caught expeditionary forces by surprise, even when their possibility was predicted. After every such instance, recriminations begin and claims spread that the local force was duplicitous or misclassified as friendly. However, as the case of the Haganah shows, the local force is not always duplicitous. The Haganah was open about the fact that it was following its own interests and would continue to do so. Instead, the fault lies partially in an overly simplistic system of classification.

The model suggested by the case of the Haganah would look substantially different. Every local actor has its own interests and red flags. Rather than placing the local actors on a spectrum of hostility, it would be more useful to map these interests and categorise them as primary or secondary. Creating such 'interest maps' would have multiple benefits for field commanders. By better understanding local actors' interests, it may be possible to gain some cooperation from those currently classified as hostile. More importantly, moving to an interest map system will allow for better identification of the type of event that would constitute a red flag moment for a given group. Better prediction would enable the possibility of prevention or at least mitigation of the risk and effects of red flag moments.

Under the current system, a local organisation can simultaneously occupy all points on the spectrum, from friendly to enemy. This, together with organisations' ability to switch rapidly between friend and enemy, illustrates the flaws in the system's utility. The case of the Haganah clearly demonstrates this. Given the likelihood that many future operations will call for cooperation with local forces, a new and more nuanced system is needed. Any new system of classification must work as a map of interests rather than as a system of traffic lights or spectrum of relations. In doing so, it must identify both potential red flag moments and the situations in which motivational alignment may be achieved.

---

*Jacob Stoil is a doctoral candidate at Oxford University*


---

## REFERENCES

[i] There are a wide variety of sources which cover some aspects of the Haganah's pre-war and Second World War activities including Mordechi Noar, *Ha'Haganah* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1985); Yoav Gelber, *Massada - The Defense of Palestine in the Second World War* (Ramat Gan, Bar Ilan University Press, 1990); Eldad Harouvi, 'Reuven Zaslany (Shiloah) and the Covert Cooperation with British Intelligence During the Second World War' in Hesi Carmel ed. *Intelligence for Peace: The Role of Intelligence in Times of Peace* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999) pp. 30-48; Jacob Stoil, 'Structures of Cooperation & Conflict: Local Forces in Mandatory Palestine During the Second World War' in *Ex Historia*, vol. 5, 2013, pp. 136-169



Eminent strategic theorist and Infinity Journal Editorial Panel member, Professor Colin S. Gray's new book on strategy is now available for order.



## Perspectives on Strategy

Colin S. Gray

~~£55.00~~ £44.00

*"Perspectives on Strategy examines in depth five aspects of strategy from the perspectives of: intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology. Colin Gray asks and answers the most challenging and rewarding questions that can be posed in order to reveal the persisting universal nature, but ever changing character, of strategy." - OUP*

We are pleased to have secured an exclusive 20% discount for our subscribers, thanks to [Oxford University Press \(OUP\)](#).

Subscribers can claim the discount by visiting the OUP website, adding the book to the shopping basket, and entering the code **AAFLY4** in the promotional code box.

# OVER THE BEACH: THE ENDURING UTILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS



© Paulalanputnam | Dreamstime.com - Submarine On Surface Photo

---

**Cole Petersen**

---

In a previous issue of this Journal, Brett Friedman wrote of the continued relevance of amphibious operations and the advent of a 21st century renaissance. Although Friedman gave some good anecdotes on where amphibious operations could be of use, his article left unaddressed whether, after advances in modern warfighting, amphibious operations are tactically feasible or relevant forms of military operations.[i] Certainly, history has had its share of naysayers. In the fall of 1949, General Omar Bradley forecasted to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “large-scale amphibious operations will never occur again.” A year later, United States Marines would conduct a large-scale amphibious assault against the Korean port of Inchon. Following the British 1974-75 and 1981 Defence Reviews, amphibious capability was deemed as unessential and left to wither away, only to see an about face in 1982 as British amphibious forces steamed to the Falkland Islands.[ii]

The one enduring principle of amphibious warfare during the last century seems to be the debate on its obsolescence. This article will explore the concept of amphibious operations, and the amphibious assault (a subordinate operation of amphibious warfare), and whether they are still viable forms of operation in the face of 21st century technological innovation. Despite worst-case scenario predictions, with sufficient resources, manpower and planning, amphibious operations remain a viable tool in the belt of today’s operational planners.

What is an amphibious operation? Popular depictions, such as the film *Saving Private Ryan*, leave the impression that landing on an opposed shore is an exercise of throwing soldiers into a meat grinder to pound out a beachhead. However, this is an example

of the amphibious assault (and a particularly bloody one at that), which is just a sub-component of amphibious operations in general. They are defined by American joint doctrine as “military operation[s] launched from the sea by an amphibious force embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission.” Amphibious operations consist of four types of sub-operations: raids; withdrawals; demonstrations; and assaults. The first three, due to their tendency to be smaller in scale and/or only temporal in effect, tend to invite less debate on their continuing utility and any ability to effectively conduct raids, withdrawals or demonstrations predisposes the capability to conduct assaults. U.S. doctrine also lists a fifth mission; amphibious support to other operations, but this is a catch-all category to capture the non-coercive utility of an amphibious force. The focus of this article will be on the amphibious operation in general but specifically on the amphibious assault, which is defined as “the establishment of a Landing Force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore,”[iii] and its feasibility as a valid military operation in today’s operating environment.

From a political and strategic perspective, amphibious operations and the amphibious assault in particular still offer tremendous advantages to those who maintain the capability to conduct them. Unless a state is able to secure a friendly port and assembly area to off-load its ground forces, amphibious operations serve, along with airborne operations, as the primary means to conduct forced entry operations into a hostile area – a particularly salient point for countries who anticipate conducting operations away from their borders. Additionally, amphibious capability opens up additional areas to operations, with the United States Navy recently identifying the geographic reality that the Earth’s surface is two-thirds open seas with an estimated 75% of the world’s population and 80% of capital cities along the littoral.[iv]

Politically, amphibious forces allow states to muster and deploy land power to sea without incurring the significant political costs of an

**TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:** PETERSEN, COLE, “OVER THE BEACH: THE ENDURING UTILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS”, *MILITARY OPERATIONS*, VOLUME 2, ISSUE NO. 4, FALL 2014, PAGES 22-26.



actual shore deployment unless absolutely necessary. Essentially, the potential energy of amphibious land forces is deployed early and stored until required, ready to use at the appropriate time.[v] Strategically, amphibious operations are advantageous as they can occur in hostile or unknown environments. They put forces ashore in a tactical posture and they can be realized without requirement of an air or sea port.[vi] As well, the deterrent effect of the capability of amphibious operations is useful – amphibious forces represent a “force in being” in a sense that the threat of their use by simply parking the amphibious force offshore can sometimes achieve the desired political effect. B.H. Liddell Hart noted that even in 1941, with the Allies still licking their wounds after being ejected from the Continent, the threat of an amphibious landing forced the Germans to keep 27% of their strength, comprising 53 Divisions, deployed along its conquered coastlines and out of the invasion of the Soviet Union. This factor was also present 50 years later in the Persian Gulf, where the Iraqis kept 6 of 42 divisions tied to the Kuwaiti coastline to meet the threat of a potential Marine Corps landing.[vii]

If amphibious raids, demonstrations or withdrawals are to be legitimate military operations, then the capability to conduct an amphibious assault must exist. Defenders won't fear an amphibious force afloat if they know they can repel the landing. Most of the debate on the viability of the amphibious assault tends to lie on the battlefield. Any political and strategic advantages are moot, should the threat of an amphibious assault be diminished due to technological advances favouring the defenders on the beaches. Critique on the tactical viability of the amphibious assault should focus on key factors required for a successful landing. Michael O'Hanlon, in reviewing amphibious operations in the 20th century, provides three tactical prerequisites that must be attained to ensure tactical success for an amphibious force. These are the **achievement of air superiority, the selection of a suitable landing location where assaulting troops can have a marked superiority over the defenders, and the ability to reinforce the beachhead faster than the defender.** [viii]

As O'Hanlon's research suggests, if a defender can prevent the attacking force from achieving two, or even at times just one, of these prerequisites then the attack will generally be unsuccessful. Thus, we now turn to the primary question of this article - what technology allows a defending force to deny any of these three factors from an amphibious force?

A simple breakdown of the defender's arsenal can help understand how denial could be achieved. These are:

1. The submarine threat;
2. The air threat;
3. The anti-shipping missile threat; and
4. The sea mine threat.[ix]

These threats have been present throughout 20th century warfare. To understand and assess whether amphibious operations have lost their utility, it is essential to determine if technology has created a case where it can be utilized by a defender to cause catastrophic losses on an amphibious force.

First submarines: or more specifically the proliferation of cheaper diesel submarines around the world. Submarines are seen as one of the primary threats against an amphibious force preparing to launch an assault. Boynton notes that diesel-electric submarine sales have proliferated and are exist at some level in most littoral regions

around the globe.[x] Due to their quiet operations and the inherent difficulties in tracking submarines in littoral waters, they are very capable of interfering with amphibious operations as they assemble and launch their landing elements.

The Falklands offers a perfect example of this; despite losing one of their two submarines, the Argentinean Navy's *San Luis* was able to evade destruction by a British force that was discharging over 200 pieces of anti-submarine ordinance. As the British rediscovered, anti-submarine warfare is difficult (especially in shallow waters) and generally requires a resource commitment by the hunters which is out of proportion to the submarines committed.[xi] Williamson Murray and Lyle Goldstein make the same conclusion in their analysis of mainland China's growing submarine fleet, noting that a post-Cold War shift by Western navies away from anti-submarine warfare only makes eliminating the submarine threat more resource and time intensive.[xii]

The threat over the water can be just as pervasive as the threat under it. In the Falklands, where the Argentineans launched a flurry of air strikes, resulting in at least 35 hits on 16 (of a total of 33) British vessels, and ultimately in four warships being sunk. Of these 35 hits, 12 failed to detonate, meaning the British likely escaped greater losses. The Argentineans were eventually beaten away, largely through British sea-based airpower and other anti-air systems and the cumulative effects of attrition on their own aircraft and aircrew. Nevertheless, this single example represents the damage a determined enemy can cause, even with less sophisticated aircraft and ordinance.[xiii]

In the 21st century, it should be obvious that the air threat has a new dimension in terms of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). These remotely piloted vehicles present a two tiered threat to an amphibious force. First, they can act as sensor platforms to detect an amphibious force gathering out at sea and vector on other offensive systems. Second, they can be armed and can prosecute the threat with anti-shipping missiles. Fooling a radar system is more feasible than fooling a flurry of small unmanned reconnaissance vehicles. The proliferation of these systems represents a hybrid vector, a sensory asset, between that of aircraft and anti-ship missile, which an amphibious task force must wrestle with.[xiv]

Anti-shipping missiles, composed of air-launched and land-based variants, form a third weapon that may render amphibious operations impossible. The British loss of three ships to Exocet missiles is the obvious example, while the more recent attack of the Israeli warship *Hanit* led by Hezbollah guerrillas in 2006 demonstrates the proliferation of these weapon systems. To counter the missile threat, amphibious forces will be forced to either stay further out at sea or to engage active detection systems, broadcasting their intent to the enemy.[xv]

The final threat, sea mine technology, has long been considered one of the 'black arts' of the naval trade. Likely the most cost-effective method of inhibiting amphibious assaults, Hitler ordered an extensive mining campaign of the French coastline in anticipation of an Allied landing, stating it was “more effective to sink a whole cargo at sea than to have to fight the unloaded material and personnel on land.”[xvi]

In one detailed study of the effect of sea-mines on amphibious forces, it was noted that while the principles of modern mines are not much different than those encountered during the Second World War, technology has increased their sophistication; and the techniques required for hunting and removing them are time intensive and





demand the right resources.[xvii] The consequences of not having sufficient time or resources to deal with the threat of sea-mines are apparent. The follow-on amphibious assault on Inchon, at Wonson, was delayed almost to the point of failure due to the effects of a small mined field laid by "a nation without a navy, using pre World War One weapons, [with] vessels which were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ." [xviii] Likewise, during the Persian Gulf War, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade at sea would have taken an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 casualties, had it been forced to use the uncleared waters covering Kuwait that had already claimed two ship strikes. [xix] Mines can be successfully dealt with, but this requires time and resources. The clearance of the mines in front of Utah beach, a Division-sized objective, required 84 minesweeping vessels for 24 hours. Ball estimated that clearance of the Iraqi field in the Persian Gulf in 1991 in a similar amount of time would have required 56 vessels – twice the entire minesweeping fleet of the U.S. Navy at the time, a figure that dwarfs the seven vessels actually available.[xx]

After surveying these weapon systems, we are presented with the perfect storm to render the amphibious assault obsolete. An amphibious fleet is detected by shore based UAVs and is harassed by submarines, air and missile attacks, and mines. Such a force is liable to take enough damage to prevent it from achieving the three prerequisites of air superiority, overwhelming forces on the objective beach and a successful build-up of forces on the beachhead. This factored heavily in Michael O'Hanlon's wargaming scenario of a supposed Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. Estimating at least 20% casualties in the initial attempt to move by sea to the beaches of Formosa, he concluded that the chances of China establishing a rudimentary beachhead were slim and, even if this was achieved, Taiwan could quickly overrun what little could make it past the beach.[xxi] Although O'Hanlon's assessment of balance of powers in the Formosa Strait is debateable, especially with PLAN development over the last decade, his scenario describing the process of amphibious collapse is a worthwhile analytical tool in understanding tactical vulnerabilities.[xxii]

However, such a perfect storm should only be envisioned as a worst case scenario, and it is guilty of falling into a "romanticised" (for lack of a better term) version of what an amphibious operation actually requires or resembles. Former Marine Corps Commandant Robert Cushman Jr. once warned that it was easy to build worst case scenarios and visualize amphibious assaults solely in Iwo Jima terms. Any military scenario can be perceived as doomed if situated in an impossible situation such as sailing directly into the jaws of the enemy's strongest defences. But the defender cannot be equally strong everywhere, and amphibious operations give the attacker the advantage of holding off on a tempting target that does not suitably allow for achievement of the three prerequisites for amphibious success and waiting for the right target that will invariably show up.[xxiii]

Getting away from predictions of a modern Gallipoli, the historical record shows amphibious operations in permissive and semi-permissive environments are still completely viable. American amphibious forces were involved in operations in Lebanon in 1958, Vietnam during the 1960s, Lebanon again in the 1980s and Somalia in the 1990s.[xxiv] Likewise, the British saw amphibious forces or ships involved the Suez in 1956, Kuwait in 1961, Brunei in 1962, Tanganyika in 1964, Aden in 1967, Nigeria in 1967, and Cyprus in 1974.[xxv]

While it is obvious that amphibious operations over permissive or semi-permissive coastlines are still a viable option, can the same case be made for amphibious assaults against a hostile shore?

Below are three general principles that in this author's view support the argument of the continued utility of the amphibious operation, even in the face of modern advances in submarines, aircraft, UAVs, missiles and mines.

First, technology's role in warfare has generally featured a corresponding advance of both offensive and defensive weapon systems, with new technologies generally being followed by counter-technology and adjustments to tactics and techniques.[xxvi] With missile technology comes the Phalanx system. With aircraft technology comes the AEGIS system. With submarine technology comes complex systems of passive and active detection from various air and sea-based platforms. Even UAVs are beholden to this phenomenon – as their use spreads, military establishments are working on measures to defeat them, whether these be through active engagement with anti-air defence systems or through electronic warfare that can attack the frequency required to control such aircraft. Although technology has ensured that the attacker will face casualties when assaulting a hostile shore, it can also ensure that these casualties are kept manageable; the feasibility of amphibious assaults need not be attached to the idea of a bloodless victory. If anything, the Falklands are a good indication of this offence/defence dichotomy in action and a modern case of a successful amphibious operation against a hostile objective.

The second principle is that technology also provides benefits to the amphibious force in reducing the abilities of the defender's weapon systems. What is good for the goose is also good for the gander. While silent submarines can be a plague to an assembling force, the attacker can also utilize these vehicles to track and destroy enemy boats or to insert covert reconnaissance teams to assist with beachhead selection. Aircraft, and various sensor platforms such as UAVs, can deliver precision weapons' effects on shore from afar, isolating beach defences and degrading their ability to deal with the landing force. Cruise missiles and ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, combined with modern naval gunfire support, can help to suppress beach defences. It only seems intuitive that technology possessed by the defender and thought to render the amphibious assault obsolete can be used by the attacker to degrade his opponent's capability to do so.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, technology offers the assaulting force the ability to avoid the technological advantages afforded to the defender. Following the Gulf War, the United States Marine Corps recognised that its reduced resources would not necessarily permit the execution of a traditional amphibious assault in the face of a modern foe. In creating the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea, it sought to allow its ships to avoid the requirement to move in close to launch the Landing Force by operating over the horizon, avoiding littoral concentrations or completely skipping hardened beaches by landing over them.[xxvii] New technologies should enable this. For example, the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned can move at speeds of 40-50 knots and, due to its ability to ride on the water, it has increased the percentage of the world's beaches accessible to an amphibious landing from 30% to 70%.[xxviii] The benefits of opening more sea flanks that, while hostile, force the enemy to defend more ground are evident.

Furthermore, the beach need not be the primary objective. Rotary aviation (including the hybrid MV-22 Osprey with extended range) is considered a staple of the modern amphibious operation, in that it can expand the radius of action and allow operations to be launched from less vulnerable areas over the horizon with minimal warning. Rotary wing aviation can also assist in quickly securing vulnerable flanks.[xxix] While fragile, the utility of rotary aviation, due to its



flexibility and the mobility it offers to modern forces on land, or from sea to land, is self-evident.

When taken together, technology confers upon an amphibious force the ability to counter the defender's weapon systems, degrade his capabilities, and avoid his strengths and subsequently to assault his vulnerable, yet still hostile, sectors. Technological advancement and proliferation provide additional factors for an amphibious force to take into account during its planning, but do not render the entire operation a failure from the start. The offence/defence dichotomy leaves equal opportunity for an attacker to achieve air superiority, dominant forces on a beach, and a quick build-up of forces on the beachhead, as it does for a defender to counter it. Just as critically, the concept of offence/defence implies the ability to avoid/spoof defender sensors prior to the operation, so as to reduce his vulnerabilities; if space-based satellites haven't rendered fleets obsolete, then counter-detection measures are clearly possible for the modern amphibious force.

What becomes apparent from analysing amphibious warfare capabilities is that the prevalent factor tends to be the available resources. Amphibious operations are not just about moving people from point A to B, but rather about bringing combat power from the sea onto land. With regards to resource restraints on amphibious operations, the lack of shipping is a common theme. In the Gulf War, the U.S. Marine forces afloat did not receive their full complement of amphibious ships, and the U.S. amphibious fleet is now half of its 1990 levels.[xxx] The British in the Falklands were forced to utilize defenceless commercial vessels (one of which was sunk with a large proportion of the force's medium and heavy lift helicopters). [xxxi] O'Hanlon's China/Taiwan scenario features at its core the

insufficient shipping capacity of the PRC to move enough soldiers to be decisive against Taiwan. Sea mines will be more of a threat today due to the steady decline of mine warfare capabilities in modern fleets, as these ships tend to be the lowest priority when it comes to manning and funding.[xxxiii] Goldstein and Murray point to the fact that the primary concern for American (and other nation) anti-submarine warfare capabilities is not a technology gap, but rather, due to the diminishing availability of platforms that were around when the Soviet threat was present. Indeed, the cost of securing the sea for amphibious forces is, as noted by two historians, substantially higher than the price to actually contest it.[xxxiv]

In wrapping things up, one can say with some certainty that technology has not rendered the amphibious operation obsolete. The largest inhibiting factor for today's amphibious forces is the resource requirement to counter, degrade or circumvent the technological capabilities of the defender. Amphibious operations are a true joint force capability, requiring investment in all facets of the system to ensure viability. The levels of resources required to guarantee success are hard to determine as they are dependent on the capabilities of the defender as well as the time the attacker is willing to take, at the risk of the loss of speed and surprise, to deal with and neutralize the defender prior to hitting the beach. Going back to Friedman's article discussed at the beginning, an amphibious renaissance is certainly possible, but only for a nation willing to dedicate itself to putting all the pieces in place. Amphibious operations onto undefended shores remain as useful a tool as they have always been, while amphibious assaults against hostile objectives remain as risky as they have always been. But if properly resourced, timed and coordinated, they can achieve a decisive effect of force projection, out of proportion to the size of the force over the beach.

---

*Cole Petersen is a Captain in the Canadian Army*



## REFERENCES

- [i] Friedman, Brett (2012), "Blood and Water: The Present and Future of Amphibious Operations" in *The Journal of Military Operations*. Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 12-15.
- [ii] On General Bradley's prognostication, see pg. 118 of Heintz, Robert D (1998), "The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning" in *Naval War College Review*. Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 116-134. For the British government's views on amphibious utility, see pp. 29-30 of Garrod, Martin (1988), "Amphibious Operations: Why?" in *The RUSI Journal*. Vol. 133, No. 4, pp. 25-30.
- [iii] On the definition of amphibious operations and the assault, see pp. ix-x of Joint Chiefs of Staff (2001), *Joint Publication 3-02: Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of National Defence) and pg. 189 of Till, Geoffrey (2009), *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge).
- [iv] Pg. 19 of Weinstein, Cliff J. (2010), *Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault Using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare*. Unpublished Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.
- [v] A good breakdown of the utility of amphibious operations is given at pg. 19 of Tailor, R.S. (1991), "The Future of Amphibious Warfare" in *The RUSI Journal*. Vol. 136, No. 1, pp. 33-37.
- [vi] Garrod (1988), pg. 26.
- [vii] On Germany, see pg. 483 of Liddell Hart, B.H. (1960), "The Value of Amphibious Flexibility and Forces" in *The RUSI Journal*. Vol. 162, No. 620, pp. 483-492. On Iraq, see Weinstein (2010), pg. 19.
- [viii] Pp. 54-55 of O'Hanlon, Michael. (2000), "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan" in *International Security*. Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 51-86.
- [ix] Pg. 18 of Boynton, Frank R. (1996), *Force Projection Operations: Lessons from Amphibious Warfare Doctrine*. Unpublished Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.
- [x] Ibid, pg. 22.
- [xi] Ibid, pp. 19, 24-25.
- [xii] For an in-depth discussion on the PLAN in a conflict over Taiwan, see pg. 183 of Goldstein, Lyle and Williamson Murray. (2004), 'Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force' in *International Security*. Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 161-196.
- [xiii] Boynton (1996), pp. 38-39.
- [xiv] Thanks go to Dr Marcus Faulkner for indicating the UAV threat as a somewhat unique aspect of the more traditional categorizations discussed by Boynton.
- [xv] Ibid, pp. 33-35.
- [xvi] Pg. 21 of Ball, James F. (1992), *The Effects of Sea Mining Upon Amphibious Warfare*. Unpublished Master's Thesis, United States Army Command and Staff College.
- [xvii] Ibid, pg. 128.
- [xviii] Ibid, pp. 27-28.
- [xix] Ibid, pp. 117-119.
- [xx] Ibid, pp. 94, 121.
- [xxi] O'Hanlon (2000), pp. 67-69.
- [xxii] See Goldstein and Murray (2004), pp. 183-187 for a critique of O'Hanlon's argument. For a more recent strategic assessment of the PLAN in a Taiwan scenario, see United States Secretary of Defence (2013), *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013* found online at <[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013\\_china\\_report\\_final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf)> (accessed 21 Apr 14).
- [xxiii] Pg. 125 of Cushman Jr., Robert E. (1976), 'The Marine Corps Today – Asset or Anachronism' in *International Security*. Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 123-129.
- [xxiv] Weinstein (2010), pp. 11-12.
- [xxv] Garrod (1988), pg. 28.
- [xxvi] Cushman (1976), pg. 125.
- [xxvii] See pg. 151 of Terriff, Terry (2007), 'Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future Warfare' in *Contemporary Security Policy*. Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 143-162.
- [xxviii] Pp. 28-29 of Strain, Patrick M. (1993), *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century: A Viable Forced-Entry Option For the Operational Commander?* Unpublished Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.
- [xxix] Tailor (1991), pg. 34.
- [xxx] Weinstein (2010), pp. 25-26.
- [xxxi] Tailor (1991), pg. 34.
- [xxxii] O'Hanlon (2000), pg. 62.
- [xxxiii] Ball (1992), pg. 26.
- [xxxiv] Goldstein and Murray (2004), pp. 181-183.

DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF WAR

---

THE JOURNAL OF  
**MILITARY OPERATIONS**

---

Volume 2 / Issue 4 / Fall 2014

